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Abstract
Certifiers often base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is
voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire by way of tests or
otherwise. We study the interplay between the information acquisition of certifiers and
the information disclosure of applicants. We show that the inability of a certifier to
commit to the amount of information to be acquired can result in a reduction of infor-
mation disclosed. Among other consequences, given the choice between two information
acquisition technologies, the certifier may prefer to commit to the inferior technology, in
the sense of being either more expensive or less accurate.
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1 Introduction
In many markets, certifiers act as a screening device by approving or rejecting applicants based
on information about their quality.1 In order to make the right decision, certifiers often rely
on a mixture of information. Part of this information is disclosed strategically by applicants
trying to maximize their chances of being approved. Another part is acquired firsthand by
the certifiers, through tests, interviews, or by contacting references. The aim of this paper is
to examine the interplay between these information sources.
To fix ideas, consider a college student selecting a set of courses for his final year. The
courses vary in their correlation between grades and talent, some courses generating more in-
formative grades than others. The student’s goal is to be accepted at a selective program after
graduation. The admissions committee acts as a certifier. Based on transcripts, outstanding
candidates are accepted outright, and unfit applicants immediately discarded. Candidates
between these two extremes are subject to the most intense scrutiny; for them, the committee
accesses additional (costly) information, perhaps by conducting an interview, requesting an
aptitude test, or calling a reference. This process is anticipated by the student and influences
his choice of courses.
In this paper, we ask the following questions: how is an applicant’s information disclosure
affected by the certifier’s information acquisition possibilities? What implications does this
have regarding social welfare and the quality of certification? To address these questions, we
propose a simple model of the interaction between a certifier (she) and an applicant (he). The
applicant is either good or bad; both he and the certifier are uncertain about his quality. To
obtain a positive payoff the applicant requires the certifier’s approval. The certifier would
like to approve the applicant if he is good, but to reject him if he is bad. The applicant
may voluntarily disclose information to the certifier by designing a signal of his quality.2 The
certifier, for her part, may choose to acquire additional information by testing the applicant
at a cost.
We show that the inability of the certifier to commit to the amount of information to be
collected (via the test) can result in a reduction of information disclosed by the applicant.
The mechanism is as follows. The applicant is faced with two broad options. He can disclose
sufficiently convincing evidence that he is good in order to avoid the test and secure approval
1Applicants may for instance be firms who need a certification in order to sell their products, workers who
must be certified to carry out a certain task, or potential students seeking admission to a study program.
2As in Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
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outright (option 1), but then he risks revealing that he is bad. Or he can withhold information
and let the certifier conduct the test (option 2). Commitment enables the certifier to steer the
applicant’s choice towards option 1. This, in turn, allows the certifier to improve certification
quality all the while lowering testing expenditures.3
We first show that the certifier always benefits from the ability to commit to whether or
not to conduct the test. We then show that the aforementioned mechanism leads to situations
in which, given the choice between two tests, the certifier might wish to commit to the inferior
test, in the sense of being either more expensive or less accurate. In a similar way, allowing the
certifier to fine-tune the toughness of the test conducted can hurt the certifier. Intuitively, the
better the test, the smaller the applicant’s chances of securing approval outright (i.e. without
being tested first). This, in turn, may lead the applicant to prefer withholding information.
The related literature is discussed in the next paragraphs. The baseline model is laid out
in Section 2, analyzed in Section 3, and extended to allow for more flexible tests in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature. The bulk of the literature studying certification assumes that the
certifier knows a priori the quality of the applicant (see, e.g., Lizzeri (1999), Strausz (2005),
and Stahl and Strausz (2017)). Our paper belongs to a small but growing literature exploring
the optimal ways of organizing certification processes when certifiers need to learn the quality
of applicants. In a recent study, Henry and Ottaviani (2019) examine how control rights
should be split between the applicant and the certifier. In contrast to the present paper, in
their (dynamic) setting information collected by the applicant is the certifier’s only source of
information. Quigley and Walther (2019) examine the impact of public tests on the applicant’s
information disclosure strategy. Tests are exogenous in their setting, whereas in ours the
certifier’s decision to conduct the test is endogenous. Our finding that the certifier could be
better off committing to relatively inaccurate tests is reminiscent of Perez-Richet and Skreta
(2018), but the mechanisms are different: in their setting, the applicant can manipulate the
test.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on Bayesian persuasion initiated by Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011). With a few exceptions, the literature assumes that the sender (the
applicant in our model) is the only source of information available to the receiver. Notable ex-
ceptions include Kolotilin (2018) (where the receiver is privately informed) as well as Gentzkow
3Certification quality refers to the probability of making the (ex post) socially optimal certification decision,
that is, approve a good applicant and reject a bad applicant.
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and Kamenica (2017) and Li and Norman (2018, 2019) (where multiple senders disclose infor-
mation to the receiver). We extend the standard Bayesian framework by adding information
acquisition on the part of the receiver.4
There exists a well-established literature that analyzes the crowding-out effect of disclo-
sure on information acquisition in financial markets. This literature argues that when firms
disclose more precise information about their operations this motivates traders to cut back
on their costly private information acquisition activities, either at the intensive margin, as in
Verrecchia (1982), at the extensive margin, as in Diamond (1985), or both, as in Goldstein
and Yang (2017).5 On the surface, the findings of that literature are related to some of our
results, however the underlying mechanism is very different. In the finance literature better
public information limits the gains from informed trading (and through this channel decreases
incentives to collect private information). By contrast, in our model, the applicant responds
to the certifier’s access to more efficient tests by disclosing less.
2 Baseline Model
The broad features of the model are as follows. An applicant (he) seeks approval from a
certifier (she). The quality of the applicant is uncertain. The certifier would like to approve
the applicant if he is good but to reject him if he is bad. The applicant may voluntarily
disclose information to the certifier, who may for her part incur a cost in order to test the
applicant.
Disclosure. Let ω ∈ {G,B} represent the unknown quality of the applicant. The common
prior belief that ω = G is denoted ρ, where, for expositional simplicity, ρ ∈ (0, 1
2
).6 The
applicant can disclose information by choosing a signal π comprising a pair of conditional
probability distributions π(·|ω = G) and π(·|ω = B) over the set of outcomes {s1, s2}.7 We
let s denote the random outcome of the signal π, and µ indicate the Bayes-updated belief that
4Our paper asks, among other things, whether the receiver benefits from having access to more information
than that revealed by the sender. Others have considered whether the sender benefits from having access to
information before choosing a signal (Hedlund, 2017; Alonso and Câmara, 2018; Degan and Li, 2019).
5Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and Cespa and Vives (2015) examine traders who have short horizons
and so care not only about fundamental asset values, but also about other traders’ willingness-to-pay for the
assets. A beauty contest thus emerges, in which traders put too much weight on public information, and this
is exacerbated when the public information is more precise.
6The case ρ ≥ 1/2 is analyzed in a previous version of this paper, see Bizzotto, Rüdiger and Vigier (2019).
7All our results are the same if there are more than two signal outcomes.
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ω = G after observing both π and the realization of s. We refer to µ as the interim belief.
We will say that the applicant splits ρ on µ1 and µ2 if µ = µ1 following s = s1 and µ = µ2
following s = s2. Throughout, we use the convention π(s1|B)π(s2|G) ≥ π(s2|B)π(s1|G), thus
µ1 ≤ ρ ≤ µ2.
Testing. The certifier can perform a binary test of the applicant’s quality, at a cost c > 0.
The expertise e ∈ (1
2
, 1) determines the rate of false positives/negatives generated by the test:
if ω = G the applicant passes the test with probability e and fails the test with probability
1− e; if ω = B he passes the test with probability 1− e and fails the test with probability e.
Regardless of π, the signal outcome and the test result are assumed uncorrelated conditional
on ω. We refer to the vector (e, c) as the test technology, and say that (eb, cb) is more efficient
than (ea, ca) if eb ≥ ea and cb ≤ ca, at least one of which holds strictly. To make the analysis
interesting we assume e− c > 1
2
.8
Timing. First, the applicant selects his signal π. Both π and the realized signal outcome
are observed by the certifier, who then decides whether or not to perform the test. Finally,
the certifier chooses between approval and rejection (after observing the test result, in case
the test was performed).
Payoffs. The applicant’s payoff is 1 in case of approval and 0 in case of rejection. The




− c1test, where 1X denotes the indicator function
of X; that is, the certifier pays c for conducting the test and, in case of approval, gets 1 when
ω = G and −1 when ω = B. The ex ante expectation of the certifier’s payoff will be denoted
W . For concreteness, we refer to W as social welfare; the idea being that the certifier acts in
society’s best interest.
Certification Quality. We define certification quality, denoted Q, as the ex ante probability
that the certifier makes the (ex post) socially optimal certification decision, that is, approve
if ω = G and reject if ω = B. Straightforward algebra gives9
W + (1− ρ) = Q− cP(test),
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that is, up to a constant term, social welfare is obtained by subtracting expected testing expen-
ditures from certification quality. As social welfare and certification quality are of independent
interest, our main results will be stated in terms of both.
Strategies and Equilibrium. A strategy of the applicant consists of a signal π. A strategy
of the certifier specifies (i) whether or not to conduct the test as a function of π and the
realized signal outcome, and (ii) whether to approve or reject the applicant as a function of the
certifier’s information at that stage. The equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(henceforth referred to as equilibrium for short): that is, beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule,
and each player chooses actions so as to maximize his or her expected payoff given the other
player’s strategy and his or her beliefs about ω at the corresponding stage of the game.
3 Analysis
In this section, we first characterize the equilibrium strategies. We then discuss the certifier’s
commitment problem and examine its implications for the certification process.
3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
We first examine the problem of the certifier. Conducting the test enables the certifier to make
the (ex post) socially optimal certification decision with probability e at a cost c. Hence, in
any equilibrium, the certifier (a) rejects without testing if µ < 1− e+ c, (b) conducts the test
if µ ∈ (1− e+ c, e− c), and (c) approves without testing if µ > e− c. Intuitively, the certifier
conducts the test if and only if she is sufficiently uncertain about the quality of the applicant.
Next, let f(µ) denote the applicant’s equilibrium interim expected payoff. By virtue of
the remarks in the previous paragraph,
f(µ) =

0 for µ ∈ [0, 1− e+ c);
µe+ (1− µ)(1− e) for µ ∈ (1− e+ c, e− c);
1 for µ ∈ (e− c, 1].
Concavifying f(·) (Aumann, Maschler and Stearns, 1995; Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011)
yields the following proposition.
5























> (1− e+ c)e+ (e− c)(1− e), (1)
then in equilibrium the applicant splits ρ on 0 and e− c; in this case testing never occurs. If
the inequality in (1) is reversed then in equilibrium the applicant splits ρ on{
0 and 1− e+ c for ρ ∈ (0, 1− e+ c);
1− e+ c and e− c for ρ ∈ (1− e+ c, 1
2
);
while for ρ = 1−e+c the applicant discloses no information. Testing then occurs with positive
probability.
Lemma 1 identifies two parametric regions: the applicant’s equilibrium disclosure strategy
in one region differs qualitatively from his disclosure strategy in the other. Henceforth, we refer
to the applicant’s equilibrium disclosure as aggressive in case (1) holds, and as conservative
whenever the reverse inequality holds.10 Figure 1 depicts the parametric regions R1base, in
which the applicant’s equilibrium disclosure is aggressive, and R2base, in which the applicant’s
equilibrium disclosure is conservative, with e on the horizontal axis and c on the vertical axis.
10To streamline the exposition, we ignore the knife-edge case in which the two sides of (1) are equal.
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3.2 The Certifier’s Commitment Problem
In this subsection we first analyze a simple commitment benchmark. We then compare the
equilibrium of the baseline model to the commitment benchmark.
Consider as a benchmark the hypothetical case in which the certifier is able to commit at
the onset to a testing rule as a function of the information disclosed by the applicant via the
signal π; formally, a testing rule is a mapping T : [0, 1] → {test, no test}. For example, the
certifier might commit to conduct the test if and only if the interim belief µ ∈ [1
2
, e). Let T ∗
denote this particular testing rule, and fT ∗(µ) denote the applicant’s interim expected payoff
resulting from this testing rule. Given T ∗, the certifier rejects at µ < 1
2
and approves at µ ≥ e.
For µ ∈ [1
2
, e) the certifier first conducts the test. Notice that the posterior belief is then
strictly greater than 1
2
after passing the test but strictly less than 1
2
after failing the test. So
the certifier approves if and only if the applicant passes the test (this occurs with probability
µe+ (1− µ)(1− e)). We thus obtain
fT ∗(µ) =

0 for µ ∈ [0, 1
2
);
µe+ (1− µ)(1− e) for µ ∈ [1
2
, e);
1 for µ ∈ [e, 1].
The applicant’s optimal disclosure (given the testing rule T ∗) is now readily obtained by
concavifying fT ∗(·) (see Figure 2). We conclude that, given T ∗, (a) the applicant splits ρ on
0 and e and (b) testing never occurs. As it turns out, the certifier can do no better.11
Lemma 2. Any certifier-optimal testing rule is such that (a) the applicant splits ρ on 0 and
e and (b) testing never occurs.
Comparing the baseline model (Lemma 1) to the commitment benchmark (Lemma 2) illus-
trates the certifier’s commitment problem, as summarized in the next proposition. Henceforth,
say that the applicant discloses more (respectively less) information if the signal chosen is more
(resp. less) informative in the sense of Blackwell.
Proposition 1. Relative to the commitment benchmark, the baseline model (a) reduces the
amount of information disclosed by the applicant in equilibrium, and (b) lowers social welfare
and certification quality.
11We say that a testing rule is certifier optimal if it maximizes social welfare over all testing rules.
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Figure 2: The Commitment Problem
(e = 0.9 and c = 0.05)
The applicant’s interim expected payoffs given the certifier-optimal testing rule T ∗ and
those obtained in the baseline model are depicted in Figure 2, for e = 0.9 and c = 0.05. The
testing rule T ∗ minimizes the applicant’s interim expected payoffs at all µ ∈ (0, e), which
serves the certifier by providing incentives for the applicant to split ρ on 0 and e.12 In the
baseline model, the certifier’s inability to commit to a testing rule leads her to conduct (i)
“too many” tests at pessimistic interim beliefs, and (ii) “too few” tests at optimistic interim
beliefs.
3.3 Comparative Statics
In this subsection we pursue the analysis of the baseline model and examine the consequences
of varying the efficiency of the test. Consider Figure 1: starting from the technology (ea, ca)
and gradually improving the efficiency of the test in the direction of (eb, cb), the applicant’s
disclosure switches from aggressive to conservative at (em, cm), causing a drop in the amount
of information disclosed (Lemma 1). This remark yields the next result.
12Note that if the certifier could commit to an approval rule A : [0, 1]→ {approve, reject}, she could do even
better and induce the applicant to split ρ on 0 and 1 by committing to reject the applicant unless µ = 1.
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Proposition 2. Increasing e, decreasing c, or both at once, can reduce the amount of infor-
mation disclosed by the applicant in equilibrium.
The basic intuition behind the proposition is as follows. The applicant is faced with
two broad options. One option is to disclose a large amount of information (i.e. disclose
aggressively); the applicant then avoids the tests, and might secure approval outright. Another
option is to withhold information (i.e. disclose conservatively); the certifier then conducts the
test. The certifier’s access to more efficient tests lowers the applicants chances of securing
approval outright. This, in turn, may lead the applicant to prefer withholding information.
We next explore the implications of this finding for social welfare and certification quality.
The social welfare resulting from the two disclosure regimes, aggressive and conservative, is
depicted in Figure 3, for e = 0.9 and c = 0.05.13 The solid curve indicates social welfare
given aggressive disclosure; the dash-dotted curve shows social welfare given conservative
disclosure; the dotted curve shows social welfare in the absence of disclosure. Notice that
whereas with aggressive disclosure the certifier benefits from information which the applicant
discloses, with conservative disclosure social welfare is as if the applicant did not disclose any
information.14 So social welfare drops whenever the applicant’s disclosure goes from aggressive
to conservative. These observations underlie the following result.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium social welfare and certification quality are non-monotonic func-
tions of the test technology. In particular, increasing e, reducing c, or both at once, can induce
lower social welfare and certification quality.
Proposition 3 in particular shows that, given the choice between two test technologies, the
certifier might prefer to commit to use only the least efficient technology.15
4 Extension: Fine-Tuning the Toughness of the Test
In this section, we extend the baseline model by considering the possibility for the certifier
to choose what kind of information to acquire through the test. We follow the approach of
Gill and Sgroi (2012) and consider general binary tests such that the applicant passes the
13Notice that Figure 3 depicts social welfare for ρ ∈ [0, 1] even though we focus on ρ < 1/2 in the paper;
the case ρ ≥ 1/2 is analyzed in a previous version of this paper, see Bizzotto et al. (2019).
14To see that this must be, consider e.g. ρ ∈ (0, 1−e+c): in this case, without disclosure the certifier chooses
outright rejection; with conservative disclosure, outright rejection remains a best response with probability 1.
15In contrast, notice that, by Lemma 2, in the commitment benchmark social welfare and certification
quality are increasing in e and constant in c.
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Figure 3: Disclosure Regimes and Social Welfare
(e = 0.9 and c = 0.05)
test with probability qG ≥ 12 conditional on ω = G and fails the test with probability qB ≥
1
2
conditional on ω = B. Define e(qG, qB) :=
qG+qB
2
. We fix the expertise e of the certifier but
allow her to choose any test satisfying e(qG, qB) = e. For expository convenience we suppose
that the certifier chooses the toughness t := qB of the test conducted; hence qG = 2e− t. All
other aspects of the model are as in Section 2.
The timing is as follows. First, the applicant selects his signal π. Both π and the realized
signal outcome are observed by the certifier, who then decides whether or not to perform the
test; if she decides to perform the test, she also chooses the toughness t of said test. Lastly,
the certifier chooses between approval and rejection (after observing the test result, in case
the test was conducted). We refer to the setting described above as the GS model.
We show in the Online Appendix that Propositions 2 and 3 hold unchanged in the GS
model. In what follows, our focus is on comparing equilibrium outcomes in the baseline and
GS models.
Proposition 4. Relative to the baseline model, the GS model can reduce the amount of in-
formation disclosed by the applicant in equilibrium.
The logic behind Proposition 4 is the following. When the certifier can choose the toughness
of the test, to minimize the chances of making mistakes the certifier chooses (a) the toughest
possible test whenever she believes B to be the most likely state, and (b) the softest possible
10












Figure 4: Test Technology and Equilibrium Disclosure:
Baseline vs GS
test whenever she believes G to be most likely. The type of test performed by the certifier
thus becomes (discontinuously) more favorable to the applicant at µ = 1
2
. This, in turn,
generates incentives for the applicant to split ρ on 0 and 1
2
. In Figure 4, the parametric region
R2GS (below the solid curve) is such that in equilibrium the applicant splits ρ on 0 and 12 ; the
parametric region R1GS (above the solid curve) on the other hand is such that in equilibrium
the applicant splits ρ on 0 and some belief µ > 1
2
. We also indicate the parametric regions
R1base (above the dashed curve) and R2base (below the dashed curve) obtained in the baseline
model. For test technologies in the set R2GS ∩R1base, the applicant splits ρ on 0 and 12 in the
GS model albeit in the baseline model the applicant splits ρ on 0 and e− c. As e− c > 1
2
, we
conclude that allowing the certifier to choose the toughness of the test reduces the amount of
information disclosed by the applicant whenever (e, c) ∈ R2GS ∩ R1base. This effect in turn
lowers social welfare and certification quality.16
Proposition 5. Relative to the baseline model, the GS model can induce lower equilibrium
social welfare and certification quality.
16We show in the Online Appendix that relative to the baseline model, flexible tests decrease equilibrium
social welfare at any technology in the non-empty set R2GS∩R1base, and increase it at any interior technology
in the complement of this set.
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Propositions 4 and 5 in particular show that the inability of the certifier to commit to the
kind of information acquired through the test can result in less information being disclosed
by the applicant, lower social welfare, and lower certification quality.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the interplay between information acquisition on the part of a re-
ceiver and information disclosure from a sender. Important applications of our analysis include
products requiring approval before they can be sold: complex financial products, organic food
products, cars and drugs among others. As sellers are typically better able than certifiers to
retrieve information about their own products, certifiers often rely on information that sellers
disclose voluntarily. However, to the extent that it can raise chances of approval, sellers have
a strategic incentive to conceal information. Certifiers therefore make their decisions based
on a mixture of information, some of which they acquire firsthand by way of tests.
We show that the inability of the certifier to commit to the amount of information to
be collected can result in a reduction of information disclosed, in turn lowering social wel-
fare and certification quality. Among other consequences, given the choice between two test
technologies, the certifier might prefer to commit to use only the least efficient technology.
These insights are robust to several modifications of the setup. For example, when deciding
whether or not to conduct the test, the certifier may be able to choose the expertise e given an
increasing and convex cost function c(e); or the applicant may be able to observe his quality
with some small probability; finally, the applicant may be constrained to disclose information
via some signal of bounded accuracy.17
17These and several other extensions are explored in a previous working paper version. See Bizzotto et al.
(2019).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We provide the main arguments in the text. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Note first that, regardless of the testing rule used by the certifier, any
optimal signal of the applicant is (weakly) less informative (in the sense of Blackwell) than if
he were to split ρ on 0 and e. As T ∗ induces the applicant to split ρ on 0 and e, we conclude
that T ∗ induces the applicant to disclose the maximum amount of information over all testing
rules. Moreover, notice that any testing rule inducing the agent to disclose less information
lowers social welfare relative to T ∗. So any certifier-optimal testing rule must be such that
the applicant splits ρ on 0 and e. Finally, whether µ = 0 or µ = e, testing the applicant never
improves certification quality. Hence, any certifier-optimal testing rule is such that testing
never occurs. 
Proof of Proposition 1: The result follows from Lemmata 1 and 2. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Straightforward algebra establishes that (1) holds with equality if
and only if e ∈ ( 1√
2
, 1) and c = c∗(e), where
c∗(e) :=
4e2 − 3e− 1 +
√
e2 − 6e+ 5
2(2e− 1)
.
In particular, c∗( 1√
2
) = 0 and c∗(·) is strictly increasing over an interval [ 1√
2
, e∗], where 1√
2
<
e∗ < 1. Now, let Fbase denote the frontier between the parametric regions R1base and R2base,
where (1) holds with equality. Crossing Fbase from R1base into R2base (as illustrated in Figure
1), the applicant’s disclosure switches from aggressive to conservative, reducing the amount
of information disclosed by the applicant (in Blackwell’s sense).

Proof of Proposition 3: We first derive a useful identity. Let AG (resp. AB) represent the
approval probability conditional on ω = G (resp. ω = B), and A the ex ante probability of
approval. Then Q = ρAG + (1− ρ)(1− AB) and, since A = ρAG + (1− ρ)AB, we obtain
Q = 2ρAG − A+ (1− ρ). (2)
Next, Lemma 1 implies AG = 1 within the parametric region R1base and AG ≤ k(e, c)
13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3524365 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868042 
within R2base, where k(e, c) < 1 as long as e < 1. Hence, using (2), in equilibrium,
Q =
{
2ρ− A+ (1− ρ) within R1base;
2ρk − A+ (1− ρ) within R2base.
(3)
By Lemma 1, in equilibrium the ex ante probability of approval A is continuous in e and c
at any test technology in R1base ∪ R2base. On the frontier Fbase the applicant is indifferent
between aggressive and conservative disclosure. So in equilibrium A is continuous in e and c
at any point of R1base∪Fbase∪R2base. Hence, by (3), Q jumps downward when we cross Fbase
from R1base into R2base. The remarks made earlier in the proof of Proposition 2 therefore
establish the part of the proposition concerning Q. The part of the proposition concerning W
is now immediate since W = Q − cP(test) − (1 − ρ) and, in equilibrium, P(test) = 0 at any
test technology in R1base. 
Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5: These proofs and the rest of the analysis of the GS model
are relegated to the Online Appendix.

14
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Online Appendix: Analysis of the GS Model
This appendix contains the analysis of the GS model presented in Section 4. Let tmax(e)










1 for e ∈ (3
4
, 1).
Similarly let tmin(e) := 2e−tmax(e) denote the minimum toughness among tests of expertise e.
We refer to t = tmax(e) as the toughest possible test, and to t = tmin(e) as the softest possible
test (given expertise e). The following lemma characterizes the certifier’s optimal strategy.
Lemma 3. There exists µ ∈ (e − c, 1) such that in any equilibrium the certifier (a) rejects
without testing if µ < µ := 1 − µ, (b) conducts the test if µ ∈ (1 − µ, µ), and (c) approves
without testing if µ > µ. Whenever testing the applicant, the certifier chooses the toughest
possible test if µ < 1
2
and the softest possible test if µ > 1
2
.
Proof: The certifier’s interim expected payoff from conducting test t and conditioning ap-
proval on passing the test is
µqG − (1− µ)(1− qB)− c = µ(2e− t)− (1− µ)(1− t)− c = µ(1 + 2e)− (1 + c) + t(1− 2µ).
The right-hand side of the last equation is increasing in t if µ < 1
2
and decreasing in t if
µ > 1
2
. Therefore in equilibrium, whenever testing the applicant, the certifier chooses t = tmax
if µ < 1
2
and t = tmin if µ >
1
2
. For e < 3
4
, tmax = 2e − 12 . Substituting t = tmax into the
penultimate highlighted equation, and equating with the certifier’s interim expected payoff









− c = 0.
Solving for µ gives
µ =
2(c− 2e) + 3
4(1− e)
. (4)
For e ≥ 3
4
, tmax = 1, and so substituting t = tmax yields
µ(2e− 1)− c = 0,
2
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Payoff from Testing, Flexible
Payoff from Testing, Baseline
No Testing Testing No Testing
Figure 5: Optimal Certifier Strategy (GS Model)







The thick dash-dotted curve in Figure 5 shows the certifier’s interim expected payoffs from
conducting the optimal test and conditioning approval on passing the test; it crosses the dotted
horizontal axis (representing the certifier’s interim expected payoffs from outright rejection)
at µ = 1 − µ and the dashed line (representing the certifier’s interim expected payoffs from
outright approval) at µ = µ. Notice that [1− e+ c, e− c] ⊂ [1− µ, µ], that is, relative to the
baseline model flexible tests enlarge the interval of interim beliefs at which the certifier chooses
to conduct the test. In the figure, the light dash-dotted curve shows the certifier’s interim
expected payoffs from conducting the baseline test and conditioning approval on passing this
test.
We turn next to the applicant. By Lemma 3, the applicant’s equilibrium interim expected
3
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Disclosure (GS Model)
(e = 0.9 and c = 0.1)
payoff, fGS(µ), can be written as
fGS(µ) =

0 for µ ∈ [0, 1− µ);
µ(2e− tmax) + (1− µ)(1− tmax) for µ ∈ (1− µ, 12);
µ(2e− tmin) + (1− µ)(1− tmin) for µ ∈ (12 , µ);
1 for µ ∈ (µ, 1].
In addition to fGS(µ), we depict in Figure 6 the equilibrium interim expected payoffs fbase(µ)
obtained in the baseline model. The following lemma sums up the implications of the certifier’s











6e− 4e2 − 2
3− 2e
for e ∈ [3
4
, 1).
If c > c∗GS(e) then in any equilibrium the applicant splits ρ on 0 and µ. If instead c < c
∗
GS(e)
then in any equilibrium the applicant splits ρ on 0 and 1
2
.
Proof: We consider the cases e < 3
4




Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3524365 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2868042 
Case 1: e < 3
4
. We established in the proof of Lemma 3 that in equilibrium, whenever testing
the applicant, the certifier chooses the toughest possible test if µ < 1
2
and the softest possible
test if µ > 1
2
. For e < 3
4
























for µ ∈ (1
2
, µ);
1 for µ ∈ (µ, 1].
Thus fGS(·) is piecewise linear, with upward jumps at µ, 12 and µ. It ensues that cavfGS(µ) >















































, a sufficient con-







































The left-hand side of this sequence of inequalities is bounded from above by 1
2
(when evaluated
at c = 0); the right-hand side is bounded from below by 3
4
(again, when evaluated at c = 0).
As 1
2
< e < 3
4
, these inequalities are therefore satisfied. This finishes to show that, in any
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in which case cavfGS comprises two linear pieces, or (6) is violated and then cavfGS has
three linear pieces. Substituting µ using (4) combined with µ = 1− µ establishes that (6) is
equivalent to c > 3e−2
2e
.
Case 2: e ≥ 3
4
. The applicant’s equilibrium interim expected payoffs are in this case given by
fGS(µ) =

0 for µ ∈ [0, µ);
µ(2e− 1) for µ ∈ (µ, 1
2
);
µ+ (1− µ)(2− 2e) for µ ∈ (1
2
, µ);
1 for µ ∈ (µ, 1].
Thus fGS(·) is piecewise linear, with upward jumps at µ, 12 and µ. It ensues that cavfGS(µ) >




We next show that in any equilibrium cavfGS(µ) > fGS(µ) as well. Note first that in any
equilibrium, fGS(µ) ≤ µ(2e− 1). So it is enough to show
cavfGS(µ) > µ(2e− 1).



















, a sufficient condi-











Using tedious but straightforward algebra the latter is equivalent to
4e < 4,
which evidently holds. This finishes to show that, in any equilibrium, cavfGS(µ) > fGS(µ),
and so cavfGS(µ) > fGS(µ) for all µ ∈ (0, 12) ∪ (
1
2










in which case cavfGS comprises two linear pieces, or (7) is violated and then cavfGS has
three linear pieces. Substituting µ using (5) combined with µ = 1− µ establishes that (7) is
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Figure 7: Disclosure Regimes and Social Welfare (GS Model)
(e = 0.9 and c = 0.1)
Since at µ = 1
2
the certifier switches from using the toughest possible test to using the
softest possible test, and the applicant prefers softer tests, the applicant’s equilibrium strategy
always entails disclosing information generating µ ≥ 1
2
with positive probability: either the
applicant splits ρ on 0 and 1
2
, or the applicant splits ρ on 0 and µ.
Using Lemmata 3 and 4 we depict, in Figure 7, the social welfare as a function of reputation
ρ resulting from the two possible disclosure regimes.18 The solid curve represents social welfare
given that the applicant splits ρ on 0 and µ; the dash-dotted curve represents social welfare
given that the applicant splits ρ on 0 and 1
2
; the dotted curve indicates social welfare in the
absence of disclosure. In contrast to the baseline model, here with flexible tests the certifier
gains from disclosure irrespective of the disclosure regime: at all ρ ∈ (0, 1
2
), the solid curve lies
above the dash-dotted curve which itself lies above the dotted curve. The downward arrows
indicate the drop in social welfare resulting from crossing the frontier c∗GS(e) “from above” in
Figure 4: the parametric region R1GS, above the solid curve representing c∗GS(e), is such that
in equilibrium the applicant splits ρ on 0 and µ; the parametric region R2GS, below c∗GS(e), is
such that in equilibrium the applicant splits ρ on 0 and 1
2
. We can now extend Propositions
2 and 3.
18By extension of the terminology used in the baseline model we say that the applicant’s equilibrium
disclosure is aggressive whenever the applicant splits ρ on 0 and µ and that it is conservative otherwise.
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Proposition 6. Increasing e, decreasing c, or both at once, can (i) reduce the amount of
information disclosed by the applicant in equilibrium, (ii) lower social welfare, and (iii) lower
certification quality.
Proof: The proof is almost identical to the counterparts in the baseline model, and therefore
omitted. However, note that now, for e > 3
4
, the equilibrium certification quality is continuous
at the frontier between R1GS and R2GS, since on both sides of the frontier the equilibrium
probability of approval conditional on ω = G is equal to 1. 
Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5: We first show that equilibrium social welfare is greater
in the baseline model than in the GS model for all technologies in R2GS ∩ R1base. Consider
an arbitrary test technology in R2GS ∩R1base.
Case 1: e < 3
4





















Hence, equilibrium social welfare is greater in the baseline model than in the GS model
whenever either 0 < c < e− 1
2
or c > e. The former condition is always satisfied.
Case 2: e ≥ 3
4

















Hence, as in the previous case, equilibrium social welfare is greater in the baseline model than
in the GS model whenever either 0 < c < e − 1
2
or c > e. The former condition is always
satisfied.
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Next, we show that equilibrium certification quality can be larger in the baseline model
than in the GS model. Consider a test technology in R2GS ∩ R1base with e < 34 . We have in



















[2(e− c)− 1] + (1− ρ).
Hence, equilibrium certification quality is greater in the baseline model than in the GS model
whenever
c <
2e2 − 3e+ 1
2e− 3
=: ĉ(e).




+ ε < e <
1√
2





) > 0, we therefore established the existence of a non-empty set of test technologies
such that certification quality is greater in the baseline model than in the GS model.
We now show for completeness that flexible tests increase equilibrium social welfare at any
interior technology in the complement of R2GS ∩ R1base. Pick one such technology. Either
(e, c) ∈ R1GS or (e, c) ∈ R2GS ∩ R2base. If (e, c) ∈ R1GS then any equilibrium of the GS
model is such that the applicant splits ρ on 0 and µ. Since µ > e − c, we conclude that in
this case flexible tests increase equilibrium social welfare relative to the baseline model. If
(e, c) ∈ R2GS ∩R2base, any equilibrium of the GS test model is such that the applicant splits
ρ on 0 and 1
2
. On the other hand we saw that in this case, in the baseline model, equilibrium
social welfare is as if the applicant did not disclose any information. So once again flexible
tests increase equilibrium social welfare relative to the baseline model. 
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